The Regulation of Broadcasting in Canada and the United States: Straws in the Wind by Zolf, Dorothy
THE REGULATION OF BROADCASTING IN CANADA 
AND THE UNITED STATES: STRAWS IN THE WIND 
Dorothy Zolf, Ph.D., 
University of Calgary 
A comparative study of U.S. and Canadian broadcasting regulation. 
Particular attention is paid to constitutional principles and the implications 
of new technologies. 
Une Ctude comparative de la rtglemcnlation amCricaine et canadicnne en 
rnatitre de radiodiffusion. On prEte une attention particulitre aux principes 
constitutionncls de rnerne qu'aux implications des nouvclles technologies. 
Introduction 
In an era of deregulation, which may affcct the rcgulation of broadcasting in 
Canada, it is appropriate to consider whcthcr in any rcspccts thc rcgulation of 
broadcasting may itself be irnpugncd by the Canadian Chartcr of Rightsand Frecdorns. 
The Charterbecamc part of the Constitution of Canada on April 17.1982. Of particular 
rclevancc to the regulation of broadcasting is section 2(b), which reads as follows: 
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: .......... 
(b) freedom of thought. belief, opinion and expression 
including freedom of the press and other media of 
communication. 
If any provisions of the Broadcasting Act, or of regulations under thc Act, are 
inconsistent with section 2(b). it is thcn necessary to turn to section 52(c) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, which provides that the Constitution of Canada (including the 
Charter) is "the supreme Law of Canada" and that any law that is inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Constitution is, to theextent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect 
(Constitution Act, 1982, sec. 52 (1)). 
In the course of considering the potential impact of the guarantee contained in 
section 2@), it will be necessary to refer to American constitutional law, and in 
particular the First Amendment guarantee of "freedom of speech". This is not because 
the interpretation of the American constitution is conclusive on.what the interpretation 
of a similar guarantee in the Canadian Charter should be. Indeed, it is clear from 
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada that structural and contextual differences 
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between the Charter and the American Constitution require caution and restraint by 
canadian judges when referring to decisions of Amcrican courts interpreting their 
constitution. It is nevertheless also m e  that judgments of the Supreme Court of 
Cam& interpreting rights and frcedoms guaranteed by the Charter have not hesitated 
to refer to American doctrines, sometimes relying upon them and at other times 
distinguishing them. Among the questions to be asked are some that are politically 
sensitive and jeopardise the rationales of broadcast regulations that many Canadians 
hold dear. TO focus the light of the Charter upon them is not to advocate abandonment 
of such regulation. Students of communications policy. no less than lawyers and 
judges, should be capable of dispassionate analysis of the implications of our recent 
constitutional reform. 
Section 2(b) of The Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Before proceeding with the analysis of the effect of the Charter, it is necessary to 
refer bricfly to some aspects of the origins and history of broadcast regulation in both 
Canada and the Unitcd Statcs. 
In the Unitcd Smtcs the fcdcml regulatory agency since 1934 has been the Fcdcnl 
Communications Commission (FCC). In Canada, from 1936 to 1958 thc Board of 
Governors of thc Canadian Broadcasting Corporation regulated not only the radio and 
television stations which werc owncd and opcrated by it, but also privately-owned 
stations whether or not they were affiliated with h e  CBC networks. Since 1958 there 
has been a regulatory agcncy indcpcndcnt of the CBC, that regulates all broadcasters; 
since 1968 the agcncy has been called either the Canadian Radio and Television 
Commission or (since 1976) the Canadian Radio-television and Tclccommunications 
Commission (CRTC). 
Bo~h coun~ries bccame parties to the International Radio Telegraph Convention, 
1927. This maty assigned frcqucncics among thc signatory states. The obligations 
assumed by parties to this treaty necessitated regulation by statute. The governments 
of both counlries, faccd wi~h chaos resulting from unregulaled use of radio frequencies, 
sought to devise a system of rcgulation that would prevent signal interference among 
broadcaster's. It was then generally bclieved that radio frequencies were a scarce 
resource. As we shall see, it has been argued recenlly that this was a misconception. 
Thcre are two distinctive fcatures of the Canadian broadcasting system: first, the 
existence of a strong publicly-owned component in Canadian broadcasting, and, 
second, regulations applicable to both public and private broadcasters, that require a 
specified minimum proportion of Canadian programming content. These 
characteristics do not reflect a lesser Canadian commitment to the liberal economic 
hiition or to a capitalist form of mixed economy than is the case in the United States. 
Rather, these features are a product of Canadian governmental policies from the 1930s 
Onward, which have had as their goal the use of broadcasting as an instrument of 
"ational unity and national identity. The objective has been to prcvcnt Canada from 
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becoming culturally and ultimately politically dependent upon the United States. 
Throughout the decades since the 1930s there have been concerns for political 
sovereignty, and fears that market forces, if left unregulated, would bring about the 
complete domination of Canadian communications by American enterprise. A 
Canadian historian has explained the effect of these concerns and fears as follows: 
This national consideration, this desire for political sovereignty, leads to 
policies and actions that are influenced by other factors: geographic, 
economic, cultural, and demographic, that in turn lend distinctiveness to the 
legislation, b e  types of regulation, and the mixture of public and private 
ownership so characteristic of the Canadian system (Peers, 1983: 29). 
The language of section 2(b) of the Canadian Chartcr is broadcr than that of the 
American Fist Amendment, which states: "Congress shall make no laws ... abridging 
the freedom of speech, orof the press ...". Despite the diffcrcnccs between the wording 
of the United Sutes' Fist Amendment and that of section 2(b) oftheCanadian Chartcr, 
some assistance in the interpretation of the Charter's provision can likcly bc gained 
from American cases. For example, the he between frcedom of spccch and the 
"marketplace of idcas" was reflected in a judgment of Justicc Olivcr Wcndcll Holmes 
Jr., in 1919. He argued that, rather than prohibiting even seditious pamphlcteering, 
the ultimate good dcsired is bettcr reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of 
truth is thc power of thc thought to gct itsclf accepted in the competition of thc markct 
...(A bram v. United States, 250 U.S., 1919). This, then, is thc "markctplacc of idcas" 
approach. 
A second ~hcory is that "freedom of communication is also available in a 
democratic society because such a society is based on self-governance on an informed 
citizenry that will intelligently elcct its representatives" (Frarklin, 1981: 19-20). This 
point of view is incorporated in Article 19 of thc International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. which provides an important historical preccdcnt for a t i o n  2(b) of 
the Charter). It reads. in part, as follows: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print. in the 
form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
This theory was reflected in a 1988 decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in which 
Chief Justice Laycraft stated, in regard to 
the philosophic basis for the general right of frce speech: In modcrn times, 
thc accepted basis is that freedom of expression makes possible the social 
co-operation between individuals by which ow democratic society exists 
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(Regina v. Reid, Jan. 14.1988). He adopted, the conclusion of a Canadian 
commentator who said: 
Unity and social solidarity only exist, in any real sense, when individuals are 
free to make judgments and direct their lives. If communication were 
suppressed. the result would be a population which was inhibited in its ability 
to reflect upon important questions of value and a society which was closed 
and rigid rather than free and democratic' (Moon, 1985: 356-357). 
- 
Since the coming into force of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 
1982, just one judicial decision has considered the potential application of section 2(b) 
of the Charter to the Broadcasting Act. That case, a decision of the Federal Court of 
Appeal delivered by Chicf Justice Thurlow. was New Brunswick Broadcarting Co. 
Ltd. v. Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (Fed. Court 
of Appeal. (1954) 13 DL.R. (4th) 77; (1984) 2 KC. 410). The court decidcd that a 
gencnl direction given to the CRTC by Order in Council pursuant to a provision in 
the Broadcasting Act rcstrictcd the authority of the CRTC to issue or renew a 
broadcasting liccncc to persons who owned or controlled newspapers circulating in 
the arca scrvcd by the broadcaster. The court held that the direction did not violate 
scction 2(b) of the Charter. Conscqucntly the CRTC's rcnewal of a broadcasting 
licence to a company that fell within the direction, for a shorter period than would 
normally have bccn thc case, was hcld to bc valid. The dccision itsclf may be c o m t ;  
this is not the place to consider it. It is the reasons that were givcn that are of inwrest 
beyond the spccific facts of the case. 
The reasoning of the dccision turned on a provision in the Broadcasting Act which 
declares that "broadcasting undcrtakings in Canada make use of radio frequencies that 
are public propcrty ..." The Corn held that denial of a broadcasting licence does not 
violate "frecdom of expression", for, the court said, section 2(b) gives no right to use 
someone else's land or platform to make a speech, nor to use someone else's printing 
press to publish his idcas, nor to enter and use a public building for such purposes, nor 
to use radio frcquenccs which are public property. Consequently an applicant for a 
broadcasting licence does not have a right to such a licence, and the rest of the public 
does not have a right to a broadcasting service to be provided by the applicant. 
Moreover, Chicf Justice Thurlow said. the licensee's "freedom to broadcast what it 
wishes to communicate would not be denied by the refusal of a licence to operate a 
broadcasting undertaking"; the licensee "would have the same freedom as anyone else 
to air its information by purchasing time on a licensed station." 
The New Brunswick Broadcasting judgment assumes. without any discussion of 
the purpose of section 2(b) of the Charter, that the Charter does not reach into public 
buildings or public facilities of any kind. It assumes further that when Parliament 
dcclrucs propcny to be public which previously was not, the reach of the Charter can 
thercby bc impeded. Doubts may be entertained as to the validity of both assumptions. 
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partly in the light of American decisions which have extended First Amendment 
protection to a number of public and quasi-public forums. and partly with the bench1 
of a more recent Canadian decision as to freedom of expression in a public airport. In 
that case, also a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal. (Committee for the 
Commonwealth of Canada v. The Queen, Jan 30,1987) the majority, in holding that 
"freedom of expression" protected the right of political pamphleteers to propagandize 
at the Dorval Airport, made no mention of the New Bruwick  Broadcasting reasoning. 
If the majority judges had considcrcd it to be correcl, as did two dissenting judges, 
they would surely have said so. The reasoning in the New Brunswick Broadcasting 
case, in so far as it is based on the "propcny" issue. is thcrcfore of doubtful status even 
in the Fedcral Court of Appeal. 
It may moreover be argued that the approach takcn in the decision in the New 
Brunswick Broadcasting case, in effect treating all publicly owned facilities as king 
completely beyond the compass of scction 2@) of the Charlcr, does not rcflcct thc kind 
of large, libcral or gencrous intcrprctation of scction 2(b) that the Suprcmc Court of 
Canada has said should mark thc courts' approach to thc Charter (Ifunter v. Southam 
Inc.(1984) 2 S.CR.145). Thc intcrprctation givcn scction 2 0 )  in the New Brunswick 
Broadcasting case, if applied bcyond broadcasting, would lcavc thc govcrnance of 
freedom of expression in a wide varicty of places -- for cxample, govcrnmcnt office 
buildings. public parks, public strccts and highways - cntircly undcr thc control of the 
govemmcnt without constitutional limitation. 
What of the point taken by Chicf Justicc Thurlow. that a would-bc broadcasting 
licensee dcnicd a liccncc can purchase broadcast timc from a successful liccnscc? If 
broadcasting frcqucncics wcrc unlimited, as thc ability to produce a ncwspaper is 
thought u> be in the scnsc that anyone with suflicicnt capital can physically do so, 
would such an argument bc considered seriously? Imagine such reasoning bcing 
applied to the statutory licensing of newspapers. I t  is hard to bclicve that. if a law 
permitted the refusal of a licence to print a newspapcr bccausc thc proprictor operated 
a broadcasting station in ~ h c  same area, any weight would bc givcn to a justification 
on the basis that the proprietor could purchase space in a newspapcr that is liccnscd. 
What the International Covenant describes as the "freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information", applied to the Charter as mcaning that scction 2(b) "protects both 
spcakcr and listcncr" (Regina v. Reid, Jan 14, 1988 (Alberta Court of Appeal)) is 
arguably offcndcd by a licensing systcm in cithcr case. To recognizc this is not to 
advocate a conclusion that the system of licensing of broadcasting stations is invalid 
on constitutional grounds. We mcrely advance this point: even if "frcedom of 
opinion" and "freedom of expression" contain inhcrcnt limits to bc found in "the 
historical origins of the concepts enshrined (Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.(1985) 
S.CR. 295, p. 344 (Supreme Court of Canada)) in section 2(b) (such as rulcs of law 
prohibiting mischievous or defamatory utterances (Regina v. Reid supra. 1988), it is 
quite arguable that a system of licensing offends the constitutional guarantee. If that 
wcre held to be so, any and all legislativeenacmcnts designed to furthcr public policies 
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in regard to broadcasting in Canada would not necessarily be constitutionally invalid. 
For, assuming that some aspect of the statutory licensing scheme violated section 2(b), 
it might still be salvaged if it satisfied the standards exacted by section 1 of the Charter 
as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Oakes.((l986). 
1 S.C.R. 103). 
Some Implications of Section 2(b) of the Canadian ~harter 'of  ~ i ~ h t s  
and Freedoms for the Regulation of Broadcasting in Canada 
The foundation upon which any attack on the statutory regulation of radio and 
television broadcasting would have to be based is the "freedom of expression" 
guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Charter, which has alrcady been quoted in full. The 
discussion which follows assumes, contrary to the New Brunswick Broadcasting case, 
that certain aspects of the Broadcasting Act or re ylations made under it violate section 
2@). If the Act in any way violates section 2(b) regulation could only be sustained by 
the provisions of section 1 of the Charter. Section 1 has no equivalent in the American 
Constitution. In the Unitcd States. limits to rights and freedoms that are found in the 
Bill of Righrs havc been created and dcfined by judicial decisions. In Canada, on the 
othcr hand, section 1 of thc Charter provides the cxclusive critcria for the justification 
of limits on rights and freedoms that are guaranteed by the Charter. It reads: "The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the righls and freedoms set out 
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can bc demons~rably 
justified in a frce and democratic society." 
In Oakes. the Suprcmc Court authoritatively laid down the following propositions 
to govcm the intcrprctation of scction 1: Two "central criteria" must be satisfied to 
establish that a limit is protected by section 1. Thcy refer to the objective of the limit, 
and to the means chosen to attain that objective. As for the objective, it 
is necessary, at a minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are 
pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before it can be 
characterized as sufficiently important. 
As for the means chosen to attain the objective, it must be shown 
that they arc reasonable and dcmonsvably justified. This involves a form of 
proportionality test' 
of which Lhcre are three components: 
(i) First, the measures adoptcd must be carefully designed to achieve the 
objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on 
irrational considcrations. In short, they must be rationally connected to 
the objective. 
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(ii) Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this 
first sense, should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in 
question ... 
(iii) Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures 
which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the 
objective which has been identified a of 'sufficient importance'. 
In support of the system of regulation established by the Broadcasting Act, if it 
were held that the system itself infringes section 20)  "frcedom of expression", the 
government would likely have little difficulty in persuading a court to agree. A major 
objective of this statute - the avoidance of technological chaos. After all the statute 
relates to what in Oakes were described as "concerns that are pressing and substantial 
in a free and democratic society". In the absence of such a system of regulation, the 
right of listeners and viewers to have the benefit of the "marketplace of ideas" would 
be impaired. Moreover, without such a licensing syswm, Canada would be unable to 
comply with its international obligations. Assuming that the very system of licensing 
meets the O a k s  test, the technical aspect of the regulatory system would then have to 
meet the three-part "proportionality test" which Oakes imposes when the "means 
chosen" to attain the objective are assessed under section 1. The system of licensing 
is surely rationally connected to the objective. As to whether the system of licensing, 
as it is applied by the regulatory agency, impairs freedom of expression "as little as 
possible", and whether there is "a proportionality" between the effects of the licensing 
system and the objectives of avoiding domestic and international chaos, these 
questions merit more attention than space permits. 
An important kind of regulation by the CRTC governs the extent to which the 
liccnscc's programs must contain "Canadian contcnt". Since 1959 the CRTC and its 
prcdcccssor have made regulations that have varicd in the course of time as to details, 
but essentially require a certain proportion of broadcast time to be of "Canadian 
content". The rust question is whether such rules, even though they do not resmct the 
content of any specific programs. nevertheless violate section 2(b). It is well 
established that, apart from any constitutional imperatives that may arise from the 
provisions of the Charter. the power given by section 16(b)(ix) of the Broadcasting 
Act to the CRTC to make regulations "respecting such other matters as it deems 
necessary for the furtherance of its objectives", gives the Commission power to 
regulate broadcasting content The Commission has in fact regulated such content in 
various ways, some of which will now be discussed. Section 3(d) of the  roadc casting 
Act "declares" that 
the programming provided by the Canadian broadcasting system should be 
varied and comprehensive ... and the programming provided by each 
broadcaster should be of high standard, using predominanrly Canadian 
creative and orher resources. (Emphasis added) 
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Before the adoption of the Charter of Rights, the Supreme Court of Canada 
considered a condition requiring a licensee to broadcast a certain number of hours of 
cmadian drama. The coun held that the condition did not violate section 3(c) of the 
Broadcasting Act, which imposes upon licensees "a responsibility for programs they 
broadcastv but adds that "the.right to freedom of expression and the right of persons 
to receive programs ... is unquestioned". The court was of the view that the condition 
did not restrict freedom of expression in any particular Canadian drama that would be 
(CTVTelevision Network Ltd. v. CRTC (1982) 1 S.C.R.530; 134 DLR. (3d) 
193). The condition that was imposed in that case is no different in kind from the 
Canadian content regulations. If these regulations were'challenged as being in 
violation of section 2(b) of the Charter, and indeed if section 3(d) of the Broadcasting 
Act were challenged on the same ground, such a challenge would be unsuccessful if 
the reasoning in the pre-Charter case were followed. However, if section 2(b) is given 
a generous and liberal interpretation. (Ilunter v. Southam Inc. (1984) 2 S.CR. 145) a 
court might hold that it is violawd by Canadian content regulations even though no 
attempt is made to decrce that some particular program must bc "Canadian" or what 
point of view is to bc exprcsscd in the "Canadian content". If a licensee preferred to 
broadcast mostly American programs, it could bc argucd that the Canadian content 
regulations olfcnd the licensee's frccdom of expression protcctcd by section 2@), and 
that this is no less so because the regulations incrcasc Ihe ability of Canadian viewers 
and listeners to receive Canadian programs. The latter would be a consideration under 
the ensuing section 1 analysis. 
Assuming that section 3(d) of thc Broadcasting Act or the Canadian contcnt 
regulations, or both, are in violation of section 2(b) of the Charter. would the slatute 
and regulations as to Canadian content mcct the conditions of section 1 of thc Charter 
as interpreted in Oakes? The objective of the Act and regulations is to stimulate 
programming about Canadian affairs and to cause Canadian ralent to be used, thus 
enhancing the consciousness of Canadian listeners and viewers of the heritage and 
identity of the Canadian nation. These objectives have been regarded as elements of 
the cornerstone of Canadian broadcasting policy since the 1930s. A nation-state is not 
likely to survive as a society that is "free" in the sense of being sovereign and 
independent of other nations, unless it is culturally autonomous and its citizens share 
a knowledgeable pride in their heritage. Bearing in mind the pervasiveness of 
American television programs and popular music that threaten continually to swamp 
English Canah's airwaves, a court would likely conclude that the objectives of the 
Canadian-content regulations relate to "concerns that are pressing and substantial in a 
free and democratic society". As to the means chosen to achieve the objective, and 
whether such regulations satisfy the three-part O d e s  proportionality test, many 
broadcasters might argue vigorously that the regulations are overly broad, unduly 
impair freedom of expression, and lack proportionality. Aregulation which prescribes 
fhat a certain proportion of broadcast time be devoted to Canadian content is, of course. 
merely one way of framing a rule that might have been drafted in terms of a maximum 
of so much time being devoted to foreign content. 
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Evcn if section 2(b) were to be limited to the protection of the expression of 
information and opinion in regard to political mattcrs, it could be argucd that the 
rcgulation inhibits Canadian tclcvision networks from importing American ind other 
forcign programming on news and public affairs, bccause Canadian broadcastcrs are 
morc likely to want to use as much of the importcd contcnt time for popular 
cntertainmcnt programs that an: appealing to advertisers. If such is a consequence of 
Lhc Canadian contcnt regulations, thcn thcre is, in the result, a reduction of the ability 
of Canadians to benefit from programs about world affairs or even about domestic 
affairs in other leading democracies. There is an impairment of the "frcedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers" that is 
protected by Article 19(2) of the International Covcnant on Civil and Political Rights 
to which Canada is a party. Moreover, thc Canadian contcnt rules may be 
disproportionate in theirrcsltictions on Canadian broadcastcrs' frccdom of expression, 
in view of the cmcrgencc of Amcrican dircct-to-homc satcllitcs capablc of dclivcring 
American programs dircct to Canadian homes, apmmcnt buildings and hotcls wilhout 
bcing subjcct, at prcscnt. to any Canadian contcnt rcgulation. The morc Canadians 
tune in to such Amcrican satcllitc programs, thc lcss cffcctivc arc thc Canadian contcnt 
rulcs in funhcring thcir objective, whilc at the same time impairing thc frccdom of 
Canadian broadcastcrs. 
The Fairness Doctrine in the United States 
Even if the "fairness doctrine" is not dircctly related to the discussion of the 
rcgulation of broadcasting in Canada, it has considcrablc impact on the regulation of 
broadcasting in the United Statcs. I& rationale and its dcfccts nccd to be explored as 
thcy may have an indircct cffcct on the analysis of Canadian issucs. 
The Supreme Court of the Unitcd States, in Miami ilerald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo. (418 U.S. 241) held in 1974 that the Fist Amendment invalidated a state 
statutc which imposed upon a newspaper an obligation to grant a "right of reply" to 
political candidates whom the ncwspapcr had criticized on their rccord. Chicf Justice 
Burgcr said that such a right of access, involving as it docs governmental cocrcion, 
violates the First Amendment and that the First Amendment does not mandate press 
responsibility, however desirable the latter might be. YCL in 1969 in Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. (395 US. 367) the Supreme Court had uphcld FCC 
rcguhtions known as the "fairness doctrine". These regulations require broadcasting 
stations to providc discussion of public issues, fair covcrage of each side of an issue, 
and a right of reply by persons attacked on a station. The Court unanimously supported 
a limited right of access to the broadcasting media. Spwking for the Court. Justice 
White found that access would "enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech 
and press." 
The inconsistency between the Court's approach to the print media and its 
approach to broadcasting stations is apparent. In the one case the Court rejected 
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governmental regulation of a private newspaper's content; in the other the Court 
supported governmental regulation of a broadcasting station's programme content 
Thc difference can bc explained, if at all, by Red Lion's emphasis on "the scarcity of 
broadcast frcqucncies and the legitimateclaims of those unable wilhout govcmmental 
assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views." The last 
part of this reasoning, if applied to the Miami I-lerald case, would have supported a 
governmentally guaranteed "fair access" to a newspapcr's columns, but the reasoning 
was not applied to produce that result. There is, in consequence, an unresolved 
inconsistency of principle in these two Supreme Court decisions. 
Although in Canada the CRTC has no regulations comparable to the FCC 
regulations which have been known as the "fairness doctrine", section 3(d) of the 
Canadian Broadcasting Act itself states: 
3. It is hereby declared that ..................................................... 
(d) the programming provided by the Canadian 
broadcasting system should be varied and 
comprehensive and should provide reasonable, 
balancd opportunity for the expression of differing 
views on matters of public concern, and the 
programming provided by a c h  broadcaster should be 
of high standard, using predominantly Canadian 
creative and other resources: 
This provision is pcrhaps unclear as to whether the obligation to "provide reasonable, 
balanced opponunity for the expression of differing views on matters of public 
concern" applies only to the system as a whole, or is also to be exacted of a particular 
broadcaster. If it applies to the latter, there may be a limit on the freedom of expression 
guaranteed by section 2(b), and if so i t  would be necessary to scrutinize that limit in 
the form of a section 1 analysis. In the United States, the fairness doctrine and the very 
regulation of broadcasting are based on the assumption that there is a spectrum scarcity. 
Thus, as far as "fairness" is concerned, a person desiring to reply to an attack would 
not in reality be able to reply unless the broadcaster were required to broadcast it, so 
that a balanced presentation of issues would be received by listeners and viewers. 
The attitude of Americans to deregulation of the broadcasting industry, beginning 
with the deregulation of cable distribution, is closcly related to their continued 
acceptance or their rejection of the theory of spectrum scarcity. Those persons, like a 
previous chairman of the FCC, Charles D. Ferris, who continue to espouse the theory 
of spectrum scarcity (at l as t  in the case of off-air signals), support the fairnessdoctrine 
and oppose deregulation of program content (Ferris and Kirkland, 1985-86). Other 
pcrsons like Mark S. Fowler, Chairman of the FCC from 198 1 until the spring of 1987, 
contend that the theory of spectrum scarcity, if it ever was valid, no longer is. They 
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argue that the fairness doctrine should beabolished. Effective January 1,1988 theFC~  
agrccd to this interpretation and supports the deregulation of program content. 
Competition to over-the-air broadcasting from new media has led to an 
awareness that traditional broadcasting is just one of many information 
dclivcry systems. Technological plenty is forcing a widespread 
reconsideration of the role competition can play in broadcasting regulation. 
And regulators and others have become increasingly aware that regulatory 
processes have infringed the first amendment rights of broadcasters without 
a sufficiently compclling constitutional justification (Fowler and Brenner, 
1982: 209). 
He alleged that the "original electromagnetic sin" occurred when "Conpess reserved 
a portion of the spectrum (and, in fact. not a very large portion in terms of the 
frequencies that could be used for broadcasting) for radio and later television." As for 
present conditions, he rejected "the belief that a condition of true scarcity prevails in 
broadcasting" and asserted: 
Scarcity is a relative concept even when applied to the limited specuurn 
earmarked for broadcast use. Additional channels can be addcd, without 
increasing the portion reserved for broadcast, by dccrmsing the bandwidth 
of each channcl. Technology is an independent variable that makes scarcity 
a relative concept. At some point, quality bccornes so reduced or costs so 
grcat that new channels should not be addcd. But until that point is reached, 
satunuon of the spectrum has not occurred. The continued evolution of 
speclrum efficiency makes it difficult to say with certainty that saturation of 
channels will ever be permanent in any market (Fowler and Brenner, 
1982:222). 
Fowler's arguments supporting the abandonment of the theory of spectrum 
scarcity lack persuasiveness. Considerations of space prevent their detailed analysis 
here. Briefly, however, it can be argued that it is unrealistic to say that spectrum 
scarcity is overcome by ethnological changes which require massive investment by 
broadcasters and consumers. Furthermore the existence of a scarcity of one means of 
expression is not diminished by the availability of news and information through other 
distribution tcchnologics such as videos, newspapers, magazines and other media 
Supporters of cxtcnsivc broadcast regulation in Canada would probably be shocked if 
a mandatory duty of "fairness" or "balance" were adopted in regard to the print media 
under a statute governing the press. But the question must, however, be posed as it 
has been posed in the United States: is there a valid ground of distinction between the 
two media in terms of the application of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
expression? One possible ground is the doctrine of spectrum scarcity. If that theory 
is not a sufficient basis for the differentiation, justification might be sought in what 
has been called the "impact theory", or in the notion that the constitutional guarantee 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, VOL. 13. NO. 2 41 
is designed to further the social goal of "diversity of views". The "impact theory" 
would argue that broadcasting has a morc persuasive impact on thc lives of Canadians 
than do the print media. In the words of an American commentator adaptcd to the 
Canadian context: 
This rationalc corrclatcs to the power theory. The power theory postulates 
that because thc broadcast mcdium is the source of a majority of [Canada's] 
ncws, regulation must ensure that it promotc the common good ... To justify 
broadcast regulation on thc basis of the impact thcory [the broadcast media 
must bc found to bc more persuasive than print mcdia] (Rossini, 1985:841). 
However, proof that television is unique in having such a powcrful effect, and proof 
of the cxtcnt of the causality or effectivcncss of such a force "in the formation of 
collective attitudes, valucs and aspirations", are not available in the literature. The 
acceptance of thc notion that broadcast media an: more persuasive than print mcdia 
and thus have a grcatcr impact on Canadian socicty nccds testing. Empirical evidcnce 
to satisfy onc such test would have to show both that broadcast media have a grcatcr 
effect on human bchaviour and that broadcast audicnccs havc a pcatcr political and 
social influcncc than rcadcrs of print. Even if empirical cvidcnce were to establish both 
of those points, thcrc is still a question whcthcr hey afford a sufficient rationale for 
the regulation of broadcast content. Thc argumcnt in favour of doing so appcxs to 
amount to asscrling that the pcrsuasivcncss of thc broadcast media justifics regulation 
by thc statc in thc public intcrcst Yct, if that is thc solc thrust of thc argument, it provcs 
both too much and too litdc. If the argurncnt is correct. thcn surcly any mcdium which 
has a significant impact upon the public. particularly thc public's ability to reach 
informcd opinion, should bc subjcct to statc regulation, evcn ncwspapcrs and 
magiuincs. Convcrscly, if we rccoil from regulating ncwspapcrand magazine contcnt, 
thcn it is qucstionablc to regulate the broadcast mcdia solcly on thc ground that they 
have a grcatcr impact upon the public and that therefore it is "in the public intcrcst" to 
regulate thc contcnt of the product of those media? 
Convergence 
Inconsistency in the application of a principle to different modes of 
communication produccs a conundrum when technological advanccs produce a 
convcrgencc of two or more modes. For example, if it bccomcs economically fcasible 
and profitable to "dclivcr" the daily newspaper's news and advertising contents to the 
residcnccs of a community by means of a cable tclcvision channcl. the lawmakcrs and 
Lhe courts must dccidc how to reconcile the diverse rules that have bccn developed for 
Lhe print media and the broadcasting media separately. The prcscnt revolutionary era 
of technological advanccs - what Pool has described as "an electronic revolution as 
Profound as that of printing" - has produccd a "convergence of modes". Writing in 
1983, Pool described the problem and forecast the rcsult as follows: 
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If thc boundaries bctwecn publishing, broadcasting. cable television, and the 
tclcphone nctwork arc indeed broken in the coming decades, the 
communications policics in all advanced countrics must address the issue of 
which of the ... modcls will dominate public policy regarding them 
........................................................................................................................... 
The phnse 'communications policy' rings oddly in a discussion of heedom 
from govcmmcnt. But frcedom is also a policy. Thc question it poses is how 
to rcduce the public control of communications in an electronics era. Apolicy 
of frccdom aims at pluralism of cxpression rather than at dissemination of 
prcfcrrcd idcas ... (Pool, 1983: 8) 
Pool has idcntificd a fundamental issue that may ultimately, in both Canada and 
thc Unitcd Statcs. necessitate a thorough rc-thinking of [he policies of regulation and 
of the consdtutional rulcs applicable to thcm. In both countrics we would expect the 
"convcrgcncc of modcs" to point toward a rcjcction of the view, hercmfore orthodox 
in thc U.S. at Icast, that diffcrcnt mcdia invitc different standards of review of the 
statutory rcylation of contcnt, in terms of the constitutional protection of freedom of 
speech or frccdom of cxprcssion. Bcyond that, it is morc problematic to foresee which 
of thc following altcrnativcs would find judicial favour in the intcrprctation of those 
constitutional provisions: (1) thc vaditional rcjcction of any state rcgulation of the 
contcnt of thc production of the print mcdia, (2) assimilation of the reylation of the 
print mcdia with thc lcsscr standard of rcvicw applicd by American courts to off-air 
broadcasting, or (3) somc mcdian that rcjects sbu: rcgulation of the contents of a 
spccific prcscntation but permits statc rcgulation of ccrlain classcs of content. 
Conclusions 
This papcr has atccmptcd m compare a number of aspects of broadcast regulation 
in Canada and the Unitcd Slatcs. In the proccss we have examined some of the 
rationales undcrlying regulation of broadcasting generally, and of the content of 
programs in particular. We have scen that in the United States the "fairness doctrine" 
is a controversial cxamplc of content regulation, while in Canada Canadian-content 
rulcs arc a striking form of rcgulation of content. In both countries, the following 
points apply: The conccpt that thc airwaves arc public property and that a licensee is 
a "trustee" or "fiduciary" cannot. in itself, justify content regulation. Nor can such 
rcgulation be justified by thc lhcory that broadcast media have a persuasive impact 
upon the public significantly grcater than that of print media and that therefore 
broadcast mcdia should be regulated in the public interest or to serve what are 
pcrccivcd as national goals. 
Bcyond that wc have attcrnpted to show that tcchnological advances in radio and 
tclcvision off-air broadcasting have not rcndcrcd the spectrum scarcity theory 
obsolctc; nor docs thc multiplication of other information and opinion dclivery systems 
contribute to such obsolesccncc. In contending against those arguments wc have. 
I 
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I however, questioned content-regulation bascd upon invalid arguments. Wc have noted 
the significance of the "convergence" of technological resources, which will blur the 
already artificial distinction that has been drawn between the broadcast media and the 
print media in terms of constitutional protection of'freedom of speech or freedom of 
expression. 
1 The implications of thc recent Canadian Constitutional amendment have been 
I cxamined in terms of possible judicial invalidation of well-established grounds and 
' methods of regulation of broadcasting. Even if such invalidation should prove not to 
be the result of Canadian constitutional litigation. the vcry analysis of the ways in 
which the state regulates broadcasting, in the light of the purposes of the Canadian 
Chartcr of Rights and Freedoms, is intrinsically of value in an era when deregulation 
as a matter of government policy is a subject of public discussion. We have seen that 
I for half a century Canadian government policy has favoured a broadcasting system in 
which the state itself plays an important broadcasting function of which there is no 
counterpart in the United States, and that some Canadian content rcgulation has 
reflected national goals that have no counterpart in the Unilcd States. In the past these 
Canadian objectives have justilicd not only a broadcasting system with a strong public 
component, but also a dcgrce of state contcnt regulation that would likely astound 
American observers. Whilc Canadians have accepted such regulation in thc past as 
an instrument of preservation of Canadian sovereignty. the validity of such regulation 
in the furtherance of that objective may bc qucstioncd today in the light of the Charter 
of Rights at the very timc that cmcrgcnce of new consumer dclivcrysystems may 
1 render contcnt regulation of broadcasting relatively ineffective in fostering Canada's 
sovereignty and Canadian's sense of national identity. 
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